One form of bounded rationality is a breakdown in the commonality of the knowledge that the players are rational. In Rubinstein's two-person alternating-offer bargaining game, assuming time preferences with constant discount factors, common knowledge of rationality is necessary for an agreement on a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) partition to be reached (if ever). In this note, assuming time preferences with constant costs of delay, we show that common knowledge of rationality is not necessary to reach always an agreement on a SPE partition. This result is robust to a generalisation, time preferences with constant discount factors and costs of delay, if the players are sufficiently patient.
Introduction
A two-person bargaining situation involves two individuals who have the possibility of concluding a mutually beneficial agreement, but there is a conflict of interests about which agreement to conclude, and no agreement can be imposed on any individual without her approval. Two approaches are commonly offered to solve a bargaining situation. In the non-cooperative approach, the outcome is the solution of a strategic bargaining model which embodies a detailed description of a bargaining procedure (how offers and counter-offers are made, who moves first, how delay in reaching an agreement imposes costs on the players, and so on). The cooperative approach differs mainly in that the bargaining procedure is left unmodelled. A survey of the cooperative and non-cooperative bargaining theory can be found in Thomson (1994) and Binmore et al. (1992) , respectively.
One bargaining procedure dominates the literature on non-cooperative bargaining models -the alternating-offer bargaining procedure. The first to investigate the alternating-offer procedure was Ståhl (1988) . He looked at finite-horizon models in which two players alternate in making proposals until an agreement is reached.
However, the most significant model of alternating-offer bargaining is that of Rubinstein (1982) . In Rubinstein's model, the players alternate in making proposals, with no exogenous bound on the length of time that they may bargain, and they have time preferences: among agreements reached at the same time, players prefer larger shares of the cake, and prefer to obtain any given share of the cake sooner rather than later. Under mild conditions on the time preferences of the players, Rubinstein has shown that the alternating-offer bargaining game with complete information yields a unique SPE. In this SPE, agreement is reached without delay, the less impatient player obtains a larger share of the cake, and there is a first mover advantage. a One form of bounded rationality is a breakdown in the commonality of the knowledge that the players are rational. See Aumann (1992) , Wilson (1994, 1995) . A fact is common knowledge if all players know it, all know that all know it, and so on ad infinitum. A fact is mutual knowledge of order 1 if all players know it; mutual knowledge of order 2 if all players know that all players know it, and so on ad finitum. Rationalizability [Bernheim (1984) , Pearce (1984) and Herings and Vannetelbosch (1999) ] is a non-equilibrium concept in which the conjectures of the players about the strategies of their opponents are not assumed to be correct, b but are constrained by considerations of rationality. All players know that the strategies chosen by their opponents are best responses to conjectures, and further, all players know that their opponents know this and hence know that their opponents know that their strategies are best responses to conjectures, and so on. In other words, the rationality of the players is common knowledge. Assuming a breakdown in the commonality of the knowledge reverts to k-step rationalizability which relies on mutual knowledge up to order k − 1 of rationality.
What happens if there is iterated mutual knowledge of rationality up to any given order, but not common knowledge in Rubinstein (1982) two-person alternating-offer bargaining game? Assuming time preferences with constant discount factors [as in Rubinstein (1982) ], Vannetelbosch (1999a) has shown that common knowledge of rationality is necessary for an agreement on a SPE partition to be reached (if ever). Indeed, rationalizability for multi-stage games implies that either agreement is reached (possibly with delay) on a SPE partition, or perpetual disagreement occurs.
In this note, assuming time preferences with different constant costs of delay [as in Rubinstein (1982) ], we show that rationalizability or common knowledge of rationality is not necessary to reach always an agreement on a SPE partition. There exists an order k * such that for all k ≥ k * , mutual knowledge up to order k − 1 or a Multiple SPE arise and agreements may be delayed (even with complete information) if at least one player has the possibility to reduce the value of the cake after her own proposal is rejected [see Avery and Zemsky (1994) ]. Another source for agreements reached with delay is incomplete information [see e.g. Watson (1998) ].
b Equilibrium concepts such as Nash equilibrium or subgame perfect equilibrium assume that all players hold correct conjectures about the strategies of their opponents.
k-step rationalizability always leads to an agreement on a SPE partition. Also, the agreement is reached no later a delay of one period. Moreover, if the players are sufficiently patient, this result is robust to a generalisation: time preferences with constant discount factors and costs of delay [as in Avery and Zemsky (1994) ]. The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the bargaining game and gives the definitions of rationalizability and k-step rationalizability for multi-stage games. Section 3 is devoted to time preferences with constant costs of delay. Section 4 is devoted to time preferences with constant discount factors and costs of delay.
The Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game
Two players i (i = 1, 2) are bargaining over the division of a cake of size 1. These two players must agree on an allocation from the set X. X is called the set of possible agreements.
We denote by x i player i's share, for i = 1, 2. Consider Rubinstein's alternatingoffer bargaining procedure. Player 1 calls (offers/accepts) in even-numbered periods and player 2 calls in odd-numbered periods. Let n ∈ N be the period at which an offer is made. The game starts at n = 0 and ends when one of the players accepts the opponent's previous offer. Note that an agreement may be reached as early as in period n = 1.
Strategies and histories
In each period n, the player on the move chooses an action a(n) ∈ A ≡ X ∪{accept}; except at the very beginning of the game where player 1 cannot accept. Let h 0 = ∅ be the history at the start of play. Define a history of the game at the end of period
Histories after which player 1 has the move are contained in H 1 ≡ ∞ n=0 H 2n . Histories after which player 2 has the move are contained in
A pure strategy of player i is a function s i : H i → A which maps each possible history after which player i has the move into an action. Let S i be the set of strategies for player i, i = 1, 2. −i denotes player i's opponent. S ≡ S 1 × S 2 is the set of strategy profiles.
Time preferences
Payoffs in the bargaining game are given as functions of the players' strategy profile according to the utility functions U i : S → R, i = 1, 2; where U i (s) ≡ u i (θ(s)). Two sub-families of time preferences are considered.
(i) Time preferences with a constant cost of delay [Rubinstein (1982) ]. For any outcome θ(s) ≡ ((x 1 (s), x 2 (s)), n(s)) that specifies an agreement on allocation
, where γ i ∈ (0, 1) for i = 1, 2. Each player i incurs a fixed cost (cost of delay or bargaining cost) γ i for each unit of period that elapses without an agreement being reached. If under s the players fail to reach an agreement, let u i (θ(s)) = −∞, for i = 1, 2. Time preferences with a constant cost of delay satisfy Osborne and Rubinstein (1990) assumptions A1 through A5, but violate A6; since the loss to delay associated with any given share of the cake is constant. c Denote by G(γ 1 , γ 2 ) the alternating-offer bargaining of complete information with fixed bargaining costs.
(ii) Time preferences with a constant discount factor and a constant cost of delay [Avery and Zemsky (1994) ]. For any outcome θ(s) ≡ ((x 1 (s), x 2 (s)), n(s)) that specifies an agreement on allocation (x 1 (s), x 2 (s)) at period n(s), let
where δ ∈ (0, 1), γ i ∈ (0, 1) and γ i < δ for i = 1, 2. If under s the players fail to reach an agreement, let
, for i = 1, 2. As δ → 1 − , the disagreement payoffs converge to −∞. Time preferences with a constant discount factor and a constant cost of delay satisfy Osborne and Rubinstein (1990) assumptions A1 through A6. Denote by G(δ, γ 1 , γ 2 ) the alternating-offer bargaining of complete information with fixed discount factors and bargaining costs.
Rationalizability
Without loss of generality (for the results) the players have degenerate conjectures about the behaviour of the opponent. Hence, a conjecture of player i about the behaviour of player −i is simply a s −i ∈ S −i . Given h ∈ H k , we denote by U i (s i , s −i | h) the payoff of player i in the game conditional on h describing the play through period k (or stage k) and (s i , s −i ) describing the play thereafter. We define rationalizability for multi-stage games, as in Vannetelbosch (1999a Vannetelbosch ( , 1999b , by the following iterative process.
Definition 2.1. Consider the alternating-offer bargaining game G.
In Definition 2.1 {R k ; k ≥ 0} is a weakly decreasing sequence:
The set R k is the set of pure strategy profiles which survive kround of iteration. Each higher step of iteration requires a higher-order of mutual knowledge of rationality. That is, for all k ≥ 2, R k relies on the assumption of mutual knowledge up to order k − 1 of the rationality of the players. Condition (ii) in Definition 2.1 restricts conjectures to the set of pure strategies that have not been eliminated at a previous stage. We denote by R k (γ 1 , γ 2 )[R k (δ, γ 1 , γ 2 )] the set of k-step rationalizable strategy profiles and by
] the set of rationalizable strategy profiles for the bargaining game G(γ 1 , γ 2 ) [G(δ, γ 1 , γ 2 )]. Rubinstein (1982) has shown that every alternating-offer bargaining game G(γ i , γ j ) with γ i < γ j (i, j = 1, 2) has a unique SPE. In this SPE, player i offers x j = 0 whenever it is his turn to make an offer, and accepts an offer if and only if x i ≥ 1−γ i ; player j offers x i = 1 − γ i whenever it is his turn to make an offer, and accepts all x j ∈ [0, 1]. The SPE outcome is θ = ((1, 0), 1) if γ 1 < γ 2 and θ = ((γ 2 , 1 − γ 2 ), 1) if γ 1 > γ 2 . So, player 1 gets all the cake if her bargaining cost is smaller than player 2's bargaining cost, while player 2 gets 1 − γ 2 if his bargaining cost is smaller.
Fixed Bargaining Costs
When the bargaining costs are the same and less than 1, there is no longer a unique SPE; every partition in the closed interval [γ 1 , 1] is supported by SPE strategies. Moreover, in some of these equilibria, agreement is not reached in period n = 1 [see Rubinstein (1982) ].
Proposition 3.1. Consider the alternating-offer bargaining game G(γ i , γ j ) with γ i < γ j (i, j = 1, 2). There exists k * ∈ N such that for all k ≥ k * , s i ∈ R k i (γ i , γ j ) if and only if player i offers x j = 0 whenever it is her turn to make an offer, accepts all x i > 1 − γ i , rejects all x i < 1 − γ i ; s j ∈ R k j (γ i , γ j ) if and only if player j offers x i = 1 − γ i whenever it is his turn to make an offer, accepts all x j ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. Let γ i < γ j (i, j = 1, 2). From Definition 2.1, R 0 = S. All s i ∈ R 1 i are such that i accepts (after any history h) all x i > 1 − γ i , and all s j ∈ R 1 j are such that j accepts (after any history h) all x j > 1 − γ j . Therefore all s i which reject (after any history h) x i > 1 − γ i are not included in the set R 1 i and all s j which reject (after any history h) x j > 1 − γ j are not included in the set R 1 j . All s i ∈ R 2 i are such that i (after any history h) never offers x j > 1 − γ j and rejects all x i < γ j − γ i . Indeed, i never accepts an offer which gives her less than γ j − γ i , because she could obtain close to x i = γ j next period. All s j ∈ R 2 j are such that j (after any history h) never offers x i > 1 − γ i and rejects all x j < 0. R 2 tells us that the largest share of the cake i [j] could obtain in a continuation game where she calls first is 1 [1 − (γ j − γ i )].
All s i ∈ R 3 i are such that i (after any history h) never offers x j > 1 − 2γ j + γ i , rejects all x i < 2(γ j − γ i ), accepts all x i > 1 − γ i . All s j ∈ R 3 j are such that j (after any history h) never offers x i > 1−γ i , rejects all x j < 0, accepts all x j > 1−2γ j +γ i .
For all k > 3, s ∈ R k are such that (after any history h) player i never offers
There exists k * such that for all k ≥ k * , s ∈ R k if and only if (after any history h) player i offers
Take γ 1 > γ 2 . Then, Proposition 3.1 tells us that the rationalizable (or k-step rationalizable, k ≥ k * ) strategy profiles are not unique. One of them is the SPE, where player 1 offers 1 − γ 2 at period 0, offer which is accepted by player 2 at period 1. But, player 2 may reject such an offer, knowing that his counter-offer (x 1 , x 2 ) = (0, 1) will be accepted by player 1 in period 2. Player 2 is indifferent between the outcomes ((γ 2 , 1 − γ 2 ), 1) and ((0, 1), 2). Take now γ 1 < γ 2 . Then, rationalizability (or k -step rationalizability, k ≥ k * ) singles out the unique SPE outcome ((1,0),1).
Corollary 3.1. Consider the alternating-offer bargaining game G(γ 1 , γ 2 ). If γ 1 < γ 2 then θ = ((1, 0), 1) is the unique rationalizable outcome. If γ 1 > γ 2 then the rationalizable outcomes are both θ = ((γ 2 , 1 − γ 2 ), 1) and θ = ((0, 1), 2).
Thus, if the players have time preferences with different constant costs of delay instead of time preferences with constant discount factors, common knowledge of rationality is no more necessary for solving Rubinstein's alternating-offer bargaining game. There exists a finite order k * up to which, mutual knowledge of rationality implies that the two players always reach an agreement on a SPE partition no later than in period 2. It is possible to derive an explicit expression for k * . Let γ = max{γ 1 , γ 2 } and γ = min{γ 1 , γ 2 }. Forγ = γ,
and mod[Φ, 1] is simply the remainder from dividing Φ by 1. The largest the cost gap |γ 1 − γ 2 | the smallest is k * . Hence, an increase in the cost gap increases the speed of convergence to the SPE partitions of the set of k-step rationalizable partitions.
If γ 1 = γ 2 = γ then, for all k ≥ 2, s ∈ R k are such that (after any history h) player i never offers x −i > 1 − γ, rejects all x i < 0, and accepts all x i > 1 − γ. It follows that perpetual disagreement or agreements reached with delay can occur.
Fixed Discount Factor and Costs of Delay
We now consider the case where the players have time preferences with a constant discount factor and a constant cost of delay [as in Avery and Zemsky (1994) ]. Looking at the results on time preferences, either with a constant discount factor [Vannetelbosch (1999a) ] or with a constant cost of delay (Sec. 3), one would expect a discontinuity in results at δ = 1 when the players have preferences given by (1). However, the discontinuity occurs at a discount factor smaller than 1 as shown next.
Let {x
Lemma 4.1. Consider the alternating-offer bargaining game G(δ, 
) − γ j > 0 and rejects all x j < 0 otherwise.
Proof. Let γ i < γ j (i, j = 1, 2). From Definition 2.1, R 0 = S. All s i ∈ R 1 i are such that i accepts (after any history h) all x i > δ − γ i , and all s j ∈ R 1 j are such that j accepts (after any history h) all x j > δ − γ j .
All s i ∈ R 2 i are such that i (after any history h) never offers x j > δ − γ j and rejects all x i < δ[1 − (δ − γ j )] − γ i . Indeed, i never accepts an offer which gives her less than δ[1−(δ −γ j )]−γ i , because she could obtain close to x i = [1−(δ−γ j )] next period. All s j ∈ R 2 j are such that j (after any history h) never offers 
All s i ∈ R 3 i are such that i (after any history h) never offers
and rejects all x i < δ − γ i otherwise; s j ∈ R 3 j are such that j (after any history h) never offers
and rejects all x j < 0 otherwise. And so on.
We can rewrite
2 ) −1 ) if and only if δ ∈ (δ,δ), i = 1, 2. Finally, notice that for all δ / ∈ (δ,δ) there exist k ∈ N such that x k j < 0.
From Lemma 4.1, in the alternating-offer bargaining game G(δ, γ 1 , γ 2 ) with δ ∈ (δ,δ), a strategy s i ∈ R ∞ i (δ, γ 1 , γ 2 ) if and only if (after any history h) player i offers
Hence, the rationalizable strategy profiles are not unique. One of them is Avery and Zemsky (1994) SPE, where player 1 offers
2 ) −1 at period n = 0, offer which is accepted by player 2 at n = 1. But as in the case of time preferences with constant discount factors [see Vannetelbosch (1999a) ], players may even play a strategy profile leading to an agreement reached with delay or to perpetual disagreement. However, from Lemma 4.1, if the players are sufficiently patient (δ ∈ [δ, 1)) then there exists a finite order k * * up to which, mutual knowledge of rationality implies that the two players always reach an agreement on a SPE partition and no later than in period n = 2. Proposition 4.1. Consider the alternating-offer bargaining game G(δ, γ i , γ j ) with γ i < γ j (i, j = 1, 2) and δ ∈ [δ, 1). There exists k * * ∈ N such that for all k ≥ k * * , s i ∈ R k i (δ, γ i , γ j ) if and only if player i offers x j = 0, accepts all x i > δ − γ i , rejects all x i < δ − γ i ; s j ∈ R k j (δ, γ i , γ j ) if and only if player j offers x i = δ − γ i , accepts all x j ∈ [0, 1].
Corollary 4.1. Consider the alternating-offer bargaining game G(δ, γ 1 , γ 2 ) with γ 1 = γ 2 and δ ∈ [δ, 1). If γ 1 < γ 2 then θ = ((1, 0), 1) is the unique rationalizable outcome. If γ 1 > γ 2 then the rationalizable outcomes are both θ = ((1 − δ + γ 2 , δ − γ 2 ), 1) and θ = ((0, 1), 2).
Thus, if the players are sufficiently patient and have time preferences given by (1), common knowledge of rationality is not necessary to reach always an agreement on a SPE partition. It is possible to derive an explicit expression for k * * . − , we have Ψ → Φ (using l'Hopital's rule), k * * (δ, γ 1 , γ 2 ) → k * (γ 1 , γ 2 ) and R k (δ, γ 1 , γ 2 ) → R k (γ 1 , γ 2 ).
